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Executive summary
On 5 May 2020 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungs­
gericht) put Europe in a turmoil when, for the first time in its history, it declared a 
ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ultra vires, i.e. outside the ECJ’s com­
petences, and therefore not legally binding on Germany. The judgment was ren­
dered in the context of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP). 
In its ruling, the Bundesverfassungsgericht found that the ECB decision, by lacking 
a proper proportionality assessment, manifestly and in a structurally significant 
manner exceeded the ECB’s mandate, and that the ECJ, by finding the PSPP to be 
proportionate, equally manifestly exceeded its mandate.
The Bundesverfassunsgericht’s ruling stands at the (provisional) end of a series 
of German judgments on the supremacy of EU law. Over the past decades, the 
German court has repeatedly warned the ECJ that it would impose limits to the 
application of EU law, and thereby the notion of EU law supremacy, in the German 
legal system. But it has, until now, never actually rejected that supremacy. With 
the PSPP judgment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which has long been mocking­
ly described as the dog that barks but does not bite, has finally also bitten. 
The German Constitutional Court’s judgment has evoked many concerns, most no­
tably in relation to:
•	 the authority of EU law, at a time when a general trend of disregard for EU law 
can be witnessed;
•	 the possible (ab)use of the judgment by other member states, which might cite 
it as a precedent justifying their own non­compliance with ECJ judgments;
•	 the impact of the judgment on the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Pro­
gramme (PEPP).
In this policy paper we explain the legal context and significance of the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht’s ruling in the EU legal order and assess the response options for 
the European Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties.  Notwithstanding the 
doubts regarding the advantages of and the necessity for such action, we argue 
that the Commission should bring infringement proceedings against Germany for 
failure by its Federal Constitutional Court to comply with a binding ECJ ruling. 
The document may be reproduced in part or in full on the dual condition that its meaning 
is not distorted and that the source is mentioned • The views expressed are those of the au­
thor(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher • The Hertie School cannot be held 
responsible for the use which any third party may make of the document • Original version
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An infringement procedure in this context would in particular serve to:
•	 protect the European legal order and the authority of the ECJ;
•	 give the German government an opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the 
Commission and reaffirm its commitment to EU law supremacy;
•	 pre­emptively send a warning signal to other member states and national courts, 
most notably the captured ones in Poland and Hungary, that non-compliance 
with ECJ judgments will not be accepted; and
•	 emphasize the notion of equality of States.
The authors would like to thank Dr. Matteo Bonelli, Lucas Guttenberg, Dr. Nicole Koenig and 
Dr. Marijn van der Sluis for their comments and feedback in the drafting of this paper.
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Introduction
The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) put Europe 
into a turmoil when on 5 May 2020, for the first time in its history, it declared a rul­
ing by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ultra vires, i.e. outside the ECJ’s compe­
tences, and therefore not legally binding on Germany.1 The Court, which has long 
been mockingly described as the dog that barks but does not bite, now has indeed 
bitten – and it has done so with a vengeance.2
The judgment was rendered in the context of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), but it seemed less to be a ruling on the 
ECB programme as such and more a message from the German court in Karlsruhe 
to the European court in Luxembourg. Most notably, the German judges in the 
ruling openly call into question a fundamental aspect of the EU legal order: the 
primacy of EU law and the authority of the ECJ to exclusively rule on the validity 
of EU law. 
The judgment was rendered at a time in which the EU finds itself in a multitude 
of crises: a corona crisis, which is also a political crisis that has, at least in the be­
ginning, resulted in surging unilateral actions by member states, rather than in 
a common European response; an upcoming economic crisis, whose asymmetric 
impact will most likely deepen the division between the member states; an on­
going migration crisis in Greece; and a derailing rule of law crisis in particular in 
Poland and Hungary. In this context, the judgment by the German Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht has raised many concerns, most notably in relation to:
•	 the authority of EU law, at a time when a general trend of disregard for EU law 
can be witnessed;
•	 its possible (ab)use by other member states, which might cite it as a precedent 
justifying their own non­compliance with ECJ judgments;
•	 its impact on the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme (PEPP), 
which is intended to counter the adverse economic effects of the corona crisis.
In this policy paper we explain the legal context of the German Federal Constitu­
tional Court’s judgment of 5 May 2020 within the European legal order and assess 
the response options for the European Commission, as the guardian of the Trea­
ties. While there is good reason for the Commission not to take any action, we 
argue that, in light of the legal significance and possible political ramifications of 
the judgment, an infringement procedure might be well advised. 
It should be noted that we will not engage in a discussion of the economic policy 
implications of the judgment in this paper, nor will we discuss its consequences 
for the ECB or for the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
1 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15.  
2 M. Van der Sluis, “Karlsruhe bites with a vengeance”, 5 May 2020, EU Law Live Analysis.  
2/19
1 What the judgment is about 
The judgment of 5 May is the (provisional) ending of a story that goes a long way 
back. In March 2015, the ECB adopted the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP)3 
allowing the purchase, on the secondary market, of government bonds of Euro­
zone member states. This means that once the bonds are emitted by the govern­
ments on the primary market, the ECB can buy such bonds from other parties. In 
line with the ECB’s mandate, the ultimate aim of the PSPP, according to the ECB, is 
to ensure that the inflation target is met.
Several German citizens subsequently lodged a complaint before the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht claiming that:
•	 the ECB illegally circumvented the prohibition on monetary financing laid down 
in Article 123 TFEU;
•	 the ECB overstepped its monetary policy mandate by pursuing an economic pol­
icy; and that
•	 the ECB’s decision violated Germany’s democratic principles, which is a part Ger­
many’s constitutional identity, because it made it impossible for the German 
Parliament to remain in control of Germany’s public finances. 
These citizens thus asked the Bundesverfassungsgericht to, amongst others, apply 
the ultra vires doctrine, i.e. to rule that by adopting its decision, the ECB has man­
ifestly and in a structurally significant manner exceeded its competences under 
the EU Treaties. In line with its established jurisprudence (see below), the German 
court referred a preliminary question4 to the ECJ allowing the ECJ to look into the 
matter first. This was only the second time ever that the Bundesverfassungsger­
icht referred such a question to the ECJ. However, it still did not seem to fully un­
derstand the purpose and spirit of this procedure in its referral, since, just as with 
its first reference5, it did not really ask a question to the ECJ. Instead it seems to 
understand the procedure as an opportunity for the ECJ to simply endorse the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s own assessment of the legality of EU decisions. 
The ECJ did not take up this ‘invitation’ and ruled in its Weiss judgment6 of 2018 
that the ECB’s PSPP decision was legal under EU law. Under the EU Treaties, the 
primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, which is done through 
monetary policy. Economic policy, on the other hand, in principle remains the re­
serve of the member states. In order to distinguish (acceptable) monetary policy 
from (unacceptable) economic policy, the ECJ reaffirmed that what is decisive are 
the objectives pursued and the instruments used by the ECB (para. 53). The Court 
thereby reconfirmed that the ECB’s decisions do not cease to constitute monetary 
policy simply because they have indirect effects on economic policy and explicitly 
refuted the claim of the Bundesverfassungsgericht that, if those indirect effects 
are foreseeable when the decision is adopted, they cannot be qualified as indirect 
(para. 62). 
3  Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary 
markets public sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10).  
4 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 18 July 2017, 2 BvR 859/15.  
5 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13.  
6 Judgement of 11 December 2018, Weiss, Case C–493/17.  
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Having confirmed that the ECB’s decision was a monetary policy (and not an eco­
nomic policy) decision, the ECJ proceeded by verifying the proportionality of the 
decision. In other words: was the measure appropriate and necessary to achieve 
monetary policy objectives and did it not go beyond these objectives? The Court 
here accepted the ECB’s position that large­scale purchases of government bonds 
can contribute to achieving a healthy inflation (para. 77) and that the unconven­
tional instrument of buying government debt on the secondary market was also 
necessary because the conventional instruments did not produce the desired ef­
fects anymore (para. 80). Finally, the ECJ noted that the ECB had also weighed up 
the various interests involved to make sure that the PSPP, even when appropriate 
and necessary to achieve monetary policy, would not unduly impact on those in­
terests (para. 93). The ECJ thus concluded that the ECB’s decision was not mani­
festly disproportionate.
Under the preliminary ruling procedure, the referring national court is then 
obliged to abide by the ECJ’s ruling. The Bundesverfassungsgericht recognizes 
this (para. 117) but finds that the ECJ’s Weiss judgment is untenable and that it 
is therefore not bound by it. In what follows (paras. 120­154) it carefully analyses 
the ECJ’s proportionality assessment. Crucially it not only refers here to the prin­
ciple as enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU but also to Article 5(1) second sentence TEU, 
which lays down the principle of conferred powers (para. 119). Its analysis leads it 
to the conclusion that the ECJ manifestly exceeded its mandate when it found the 
PSPP to be proportionate (para. 155) and that this was structurally significant since 
the Weiss judgment allegedly results in an impossibility to distinguish monetary 
and economic policy (para. 157). In relation to the ECJ’s judgment the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht then concludes (para. 166) that “[t]he CJEU thus acted ultra vires, 
which is why, in that respect, its judgment has no binding force in Germany.”
Returning to the actual issue before it, the Bundesverfassungsgericht finds that, 
since the ECJ’s assessment in Weiss was deficient, it needs to review the EBC deci­
sion itself. It then claims that judicial review of the decision is impossible because 
the ECB failed to properly motivate the proportionality of its decision. Applying by 
analogy its ultra vires assessment of the ECJ ruling, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
also finds that the ECB decision, by lacking a proper proportionality assessment, 
manifestly and in a structurally significant manner exceeded the ECB’s mandate. 
This means that, under German law, German constitutional organs, administra­
tive authorities and courts may not participate in the development, implementa­
tion, execution or operationalisation of the ECB’s PSPP decision or the ECJ’s Weiss 
judgment. Crucially, the Bundesverfassungsgericht leaves a window of three 
months for the German authorities to ensure that the ECB redrafts its decision 
in a way that the proportionality of the programme is ‘better’ motivated. During 
these three months German authorities may still implement the PSPP programme. 
This implicit instruction to the ECB, via the German government and parliament, 
is in itself remarkable, given the prohibition, laid down in Article 130 TFEU, for the 
ECB and national central banks to ‘seek or take instructions’ from any institution 
or body be it at EU or national level. 
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2 How the judgment fits (or does not fit) into 
German Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence
2.1  Chronicle of an escalation foretold
The general outcry over the Bundesverfassungsgericht judgment might give the 
impression that the ruling came out of the blue, but in fact there has been a steady 
build­up towards the present escalation of events. 
Summing up in a nutshell a saga that spans several decades: ever since the ECJ 
in the 1964 Costa v. ENEL case7 held that EU law enjoys primacy over national law, 
including national constitutions, the multi­level EU legal order has been charac­
terized by an inherent tension. Indeed, from a national perspective the national 
constitution is the supreme norm. This supremacy is guarded by the constitution­
al court. 
From an EU perspective, EU law prevails over national law, even national constitu­
tional law. Accepting that national constitutional law could override EU law would 
risk the uniformity of EU law across the different Member States. If EU law is not 
interpreted and applied uniformly, it not only loses its raison d’être but a measure 
of inequality between the member states would also be introduced. In practice 
this reality of constitutional pluralism (i.e. conflicting claims of absolute author­
ity), regardless of whether it is accepted as a reality by the ECJ and the highest 
national courts, is managed by relying on an (in)direct dialogue between national 
constitutional courts and the ECJ. This dialogue allows concrete legal problems to 
be solved at a practical level without either one having to renounce on its (theo­
retic) claim of supremacy.
Of all the constitutional courts of the EU member states, the German Bundesver­
fassungsgericht has been the most vocal in asserting the primacy of its constitu­
tion over EU law. Over the past decades, it repeatedly warned the ECJ that, under 
certain circumstances, it would impose limits to the application of EU law, and 
thereby the notion of EU law supremacy, in the German legal system. Most nota­
bly it would not allow EU law to:
•	 ride roughshod over the fundamental rights protected in the German constitu­
tion; 
•	 undermine Germany’s constitutional identity; or 
•	 restrain it in checking whether the EU respects the limits of the powers con­
ferred on it (ultra vires review). 
At each of these occasions however (see table below), the Bundesverfassungsgeri­
cht simply asserted in general that it is not ultimately bound by the supremacy of 
EU law without actually rejecting that supremacy in the specific case at hand. This 
has led to the recurring observation that the judges in Karlsruhe are like barking 
dogs that never bite. But now that the Bundesverfassungsgericht for the first time 
ever has declared an EU act ultra vires, it has finally also bitten.
7 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v ENEL, Case 6/64. 
“From a national 
perspective the na-
tional constitution is 
the supreme norm. 
This supremacy 
is guarded by the 
constitutional court. 
From an EU perspec-
tive, EU law prevails 
over national law, 
even national consti-
tutional law.”
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Table 1: Important cases for the relationship between the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (here: FCC) and the ECJ
Case Type of limit Why it was important
Solange I (1974) Fundamental rights The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) first 
put a limit to European Communities (EC) 
law supremacy by declaring that as long as 
the EC did not have a sufficient fundamental 
rights protection, it would retain the right to 
assess the compatibility of EC law with the 
fundamental rights of the Basic Law, and in 
case of non­compliance, EC law would not be 
applicable in Germany.
Solange II (1986) Fundamental rights As a follow­up to Solange I, the FCC inverts 
its approach by declaring that as long as the 
EC ensured effective fundamental rights pro­
tection, the FCC would refrain from assessing 
the compatibility of EC law with the funda­
mental rights of the Basic Law.
Maastricht (1993) Ultra vires Ruling on the compatibility of the Maastricht 
Treaty with the Basic law, the FCC empha­
sized that any transfer of power to the EU 
requires approval by the German parliament. 
The FCC therefore retains the right to assess 
whether EU institutions have exceeded the 
powers granted to them under the Treaties, 
in which case their actions would no longer 
be covered by the German ratification law, as 
adopted by the German parliament, and the­
refore ultra vires and not binding on Germany.
Lisbon (2009) Constitutional 
identity
Ruling on the compatibility of the Lisbon Tre­
aty with the Basic law, the FCC specified that 
the exercise of some core state functions 
may not be transferred to the European level, 
and that it retains the right to review EU acts 
against the inviolable core content of the 
constitutional identity of the Basic Law.
Honeywell (2010) Ultra vires The FCC clarified its ultra vires doctrine by 
stating that for it to find an act by EU institu­
tions to be ultra vires, the act must constitute 
a manifest and structurally significant trans­
gression of their competences.
OMT (2016) Ultra vires After having first hinted at its willingness to 
declare the ECB’s OMT programme ultra vires 
in its (first ever) preliminary reference to the 
ECJ, the FCC in the end followed the ECJ’s 
preliminary ruling, declaring OMT compa­
tible with the Basic Law as long as the ECB 
complied with the requirements set out by 
the ECJ.
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PSPP (2020) Ultra vires The FCC, for the first time ever, declared  
an act by an EU institution, in this case the 
ECB PSPP, ultra vires. It furthermore also 
declared the preliminary ruling of the ECJ, 
which had confirmed the legality of the 
PSPP, to be ultra vires.
2.2  Inconsistent ultra vires scripts?
While the ruling of 5 May 2020 to a certain extent fits into the series of German 
rulings on EU law supremacy, there are also some inconsistencies with regard to 
the application of the ultra vires doctrine.8 
Substantively, in Honeywell, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that it would 
only find an act by an EU institution to be ultra vires, if the act manifestly trans­
gressed the institution’s mandate. But if the ultra vires act of the ECB in this case is 
indeed manifest, as would be required under its own ultra vires doctrine, why did 
the Court leave a window of three months for the ECB to properly motivate its de­
cision? Is the Bundesverfassungsgericht suggesting that an identical decision but 
with a more elaborate reasoning might not meet its threshold for an ultra vires 
act? If so, how could that act (without an elaborate motivation) then manifestly 
go beyond the ECB’s mandate?9 While it is true that its PSPP judgment follows 
the line of previous judgments relating to EMU matters, and in this regard does 
not come as a surprise,10 the German court’s judgments on the Outright Mone­
tary Transaction (OMT) have themselves also been heavily criticized. This was most 
notably done by two judges of the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself, Justices Lüb­
be­Wolff and Gerhardt, in their dissenting opinions.11
From a procedural point of view, it should in particular be noted that in Honeywell12 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht defined that the script it would follow in exercising 
ultra vires reviews would be an EU­friendly (Europafreundlich) one. In its judgment 
of 5 May 2020, however, it does not only hold that the ECB acted ultra vires, af­
ter the ECJ ruled to the contrary in the Weiss judgment.  Instead it also held that 
the ECJ’s Weiss judgment was ultra vires, without giving the ECJ an opportunity 
to further clarify its Weiss judgment. This distinction is important because under 
established ECJ case law,13 a national judge can always ask follow­up preliminary 
8 See for a critical analysis of the case in light of previous judgments, and in particular 
with regard to the domestic constitutional requirements in Germany, also: P. Eleftheriadis, 
“Germany’s Failing Court”, 18 May 2020, Verfassungsblog. 
9 The proportionality assessment by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and in particular its 
view on the relation between economic and monetary policy, has also been heavily crit­
icized by the presiding judge of the Bundesgerichtshof Peter Meier­Beck: P. Meier­Beck, 
“Ultra Vires?”, 11 May 2020, D’Kart Antitrust Blog.  
10 A. Bobic and M. Dawson, “What did the German Constitutional Court get right in Weiss II”, 
12 May 2020, EU Law Live Op­Ed.  
11 Dissenting opinions by Justices Lübbe­Wolff and Gerhardt in BVerfG, Order of the Second 
Senate of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13. See for a comparative analysis of the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht‘s approach to constitutional identity in the OMT decision also: M. Claes and 
J.H. Reestman, ”The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European 
Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case”, (2015) 16 German Law Journal. 
12 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 06 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, paras. 58 et seq.  
13 Judgment of 13 March 1991, Cotter and McDermott, Case C–377/89.  
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questions if a preliminary ruling of the ECJ is unclear (as long as the national judge 
does not contest the ECJ’s judgment).14 In Taricco II the Italian Corte Costituzionale 
drew the ECJ’s attention to the problematic repercussions of one of its earlier pre­
liminary rulings. The Italian court recognized that it should apply the preliminary 
ruling given its binding effect (even if it had not referred the preliminary question 
itself) but noted that applying the ruling would result in a conflict “with the over­
riding principles of the Italian constitutional order” (para. 13). As a result, it asked 
the ECJ to clarify the precise requirements flowing from the Taricco I judgment, 
allowing the ECJ to refine (or even alter) its previous preliminary ruling, thereby 
preventing a conflict such as the one we are witnessing now.15 If the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht really had wanted to understand the Court’s ‘incomprehensible’ 
Weiss judgment, rather than needing an excuse to disregard a ruling which it does 
not like, it would also have asked for clarification instead of simply dismissing the 
ECJ’s ruling as being incomprehensible. 
Instead of acting in a Europafreundlich manner, the Court thus seemed to have gone 
nuclear on a rather procedural aspect of a case (the lack of a proportionality assess­
ment by the ECB). Furthermore, qualifying the deficient proportionality assessment 
as not only manifest but also as a structurally sufficiently serious transgression of 
powers seems at the very least questionable and is based on a novel function which 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht gives to the proportionality principle (see below).
3 Why the judgment evokes so many concerns 
3.1  First concern: undermining the EU legal order and the authority of 
EU law
The judgment of the German Bundesverfassunsgericht undermines the EU legal 
order and calls into question the authority of EU law, at a time where a general 
trend of disregard for EU law can be witnessed. From an EU perspective, the judg­
ment constitutes a flagrant breach of EU law and a serious blow to the European 
legal order for several reasons:
•	 National courts may not declare EU legal acts (like ECB decisions) invalid unless 
authorized to do so by the ECJ. This follows from well­established case law.16 By 
nonetheless doing so, the Bundesverfassungsgericht calls into question the au­
thority of the ECJ as the sole arbiter of the validity of EU law.
•	 The judgment also goes against the fundamental notions of supremacy of EU 
law and its uniform application in the member states (as explained above), and 
thereby undermines the very foundations of the EU legal order.
•	 By disregarding the answer which the ECJ gave to its preliminary question, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht moreover undermined the whole purpose of the pre­
liminary ruling mechanism, which in Opinion 2/1317 the ECJ described as the ‘key­
stone of the multilevel EU legal system’. It sets up a dialogue between the ECJ 
and the courts of the member states, thus serving to ensure the consistency and 
full effect of EU law, though of course a dialogue implies that it goes both ways.
14 Order of 5 March 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, Case 69/85.  
15 M. Bonelli, “The Taricco saga and the consolidation of judicial dialogue in the European 
Union”, (2018) 25 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law. 
16 Judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost, Case 314/85. 
17 Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014.  
“The judgment of 
the German Bundes-
verfassunsgericht 
undermines the EU 
legal order and calls 
into question the 
authority of EU law, 
at a time where a 
general trend of dis-
regard for EU law can 
be witnessed.”
“Instead of acting in 
a Europafreundlich 
manner, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht 
seemed to have gone 
nuclear on a rather 
procedural aspect of 
a case.”
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While it is true that the Czech Constitutional Court and the Danish Supreme Court 
have also had their conflicts with the ECJ in the past (see table below), it should be 
clear that the present case is fundamentally different from earlier incidents and 
that therefore it is not without cause that it has evoked more concerns. 
Table 2: Cases in which a highest national court has rejected an ECJ ruling
Case What the case was about Why the national court 
rejected the ECJ ruling
Czech Landtová case 
(2012)
The compatibility of the Czech 
pension scheme, as applied to 
beneficiaries who before the 
dissolution of the Czechoslo­
vak state were employed on 
Slovak territory, with Regula­
tion 1408/71 on the application 
of social security schemes to 
employed persons and the EU 
principle of non­discrimination 
on grounds of nationality (the 
‘Slovak pensions’).
In the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s view, the ECJ failed 
to take into account the very 
unique situation of the dissolu­
tion of the Czechoslovak state, 
which precludes the existence 
of a cross­border element that 
in turn is a condition for the 
applicability of the regulation. 
Since the ECJ overlooked these 
facts, its decision was considered 
ultra vires.
Danish Ajos case 
(2016)
The compatibility of a Danish 
law depriving an employee of 
his entitlement to a severance 
allowance after having reached 
a certain age, with the EU prin­
ciple of non­discrimination on 
grounds of age.
According to the Danish Supreme 
Court, judge­made principles of 
EU law cannot take precedence 
over Danish law since they were 
not written in the Treaties when 
the Danish accession law was 
adopted; therefore, the Danish 
courts themselves cannot disap­
ply national law as adopted by 
the Danish parliament on such 
grounds.
German Weiss case 
(2020)
Whether the ECB has exceeded 
its competences under the  
Treaties by adopting the pur­
chasing public sector bonds 
programme (PSPP).
According to the German 
Constitutional Court, the ECB 
manifestly exceeded its com­
petences under the Treaties by 
not engaging in an adequate 
proportionality assessment of 
its programme, and the ECJ, in 
ruling the programme legal 
under EU law, equally stepped 
outside its competences and 
acted ultra vires.
Firstly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is the national constitutional court that by 
far carries the largest political weight in the EU. It is known to have significantly 
impacted the case law of other national courts in EU law in the past and is nor­
mally the court that is referred to when other national courts in the EU cite foreign 
case law in their own jurisprudence.18 An ultra vires decision by the Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht is likely to not only have much more impact on the EU legal order, 
18 M. Claes, “The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the ’Cooperative Relationship’ between 
National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union”, (2016) 
23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.  
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but also lend much more weight to any future ultra vires claims by other member 
states. The important position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht can also be seen 
in the anticipation with which the judgment was expected in legal, political, and 
academic circles, both in­ and outside of Germany, and also in the attention that 
its earlier jurisprudence, in particular its cases relating to the EMU, has received. If 
all national courts were now to come to the opinion that they too, like the German 
court, can decide to not follow an ECJ ruling whenever it suits them best, the very 
foundations of the EU legal order would be endangered.
Secondly, the Czech and Danish cases also differed in their nature from the Ger­
man case because they concerned the breach of EU law by a national statute and 
not the validity of an EU act. The Czech Landtová case was about the interpre­
tation of an EU regulation on the application of social security schemes to em­
ployed persons, and whether the Czech pension scheme was compatible with it. 
The Danish Ajos case concerned the applicability of the ( judge­made) principle of 
non­discrimination on grounds of age to a national statute. Both cases therefore 
concerned the interpretation of EU law, and in both cases the conflict could have 
been easily resolved through an amendment of the conflicting national law.
This is fundamentally different in the German PSPP case. Here the question con­
cerned the (in)validity of an EU act and not just the interpretation of EU law. By 
declaring an EU legal act inapplicable, the German Constitutional Court went 
much further than its Czech and Danish counterparts. It did not just step onto the 
ECJ’s toes, but in fact directly “stepped into the shoes of the Luxembourg court”.19 
Moreover, it did so with regard to an act that is crucial for the stability of the Euro­
zone, the ultra vires declaration of which will have more impact by its nature.
In addition, the German Constitutional Court’s quarrel with the ECJ is focussed on 
the assertion that the European court does not apply the proportionality principle 
(known in most legal systems) in a way that is sufficiently similar to how that 
principle is understood by the German judges. This ignores the fact that the EU 
legal order is autonomous and that EU legal concepts similar to those that exist in 
national law may not have the same meaning. This also means that the methodol­
ogy of applying proportionality in EU law may be different from the methodology 
in German law. In this regard, the Bundesverfassungsgericht tries to show that the 
ECJ in Weiss was not consistent with its own established case law on proportion­
ality but it does so by bringing in cases that are not comparable to the present one 
since they concerned the review of member state action (see the jurisprudence 
cited in paras. 145­151). Only the cases in which the ECJ reviews acts of EU institu­
tions are really comparable (para. 152) but differently from what the Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht suggests, these are also characterized by a large deference towards 
the policy choices made by the competent EU authorities. The Bundesverfassungs­
gericht requires a ‘full’ proportionality justification in light of the economic effects 
of the PSPP, whereas the ECJ accepts the reassurances given by the ECB as long as 
they are not manifestly erroneous. In addition, because it was conducting an ultra 
vires review, the Bundesverfassungsgericht needed a ‘bridge’ between proportion­
ality and the principle of conferred powers. Although such a function of the EU law 
principle of proportionality is not recognized by the ECJ (or, to our knowledge, by 
any other constitutional court in the EU) the Bundesverfassungsgericht still claims 
(para. 123) that it has a “corrective function for the purposes of safeguarding the 
19 D. Sarmiento, “An Infringement Action against Germany after its Constitutional Court’s 
ruling in Weiss? The Long Term and the Short Term”, 12 May 2020, EU Law Live Op­Ed.  
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competences of the member states.” As a result, not only in terms of intensity 
of review but also as to the function of proportionality, the Bundesverfassungs­
gericht seems to impose its own standard on the ECJ (and indirectly on the other 
member states).
In short, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is right to note that the ECJ’s approach 
would not meet the standard of a German court. Yet the ECJ is not a German court 
but rather the court of a new and autonomous legal order which is based, given 
the equality between member states, on common constitutional traditions of all 
EU member states.
3.2  Second concern: (feared) abuse by other member states
A second concern relates to the fear that the judgment might now be (ab)used 
by the governments and courts of other member states, which might cite it as a 
precedent justifying their own non­compliance with ECJ judgments. Particularly 
the derailing rule of law and democracy situation in Poland and Hungary come 
to mind here. Polish Deputy Justice Minister Kaleta was indeed quick to applaud 
the German judgment on the very same day as it was delivered as a defence of 
national sovereignty: “the EU says only as much as we, the members states, allow 
it.”20 A few days later, on 9 May 2020, Hungarian Justice Minister Varga said in an 
interview that “the fact that ECJ has been overruled is extremely important”. Ju­
lia Przylebska, the head of Polish constitutional court, responded by emphasizing 
that it is the national constitutional courts that have the final word.21
To put this into context, just a few days before the ruling of the Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht, on 29 April 2020, the Commission launched an infringement proce­
dure against Poland on the basis that its law of 20 December 2019 on the judiciary 
undermines the judicial independence of Polish judges and is therefore incom­
patible with the EU Treaties.22 Concretely, the Commission alleges that the new 
law, the so­called ’muzzle law’, infringes both the requirement of judicial inde­
pendence and the functioning of the preliminary ruling mechanism. This infringe­
ment procedure follows a series of developments relating to the rule of law in 
Poland, which includes the triggering of both the Rule of Law Framework and the 
procedure of Article 7 TEU as well as three other infringement procedures against 
Poland. All infringement actions were referred to the ECJ, which has confirmed 
the Commission’s position in the two first cases. At the time of writing the third 
case is still pending but, following a Commission’s request for interim measures 
on 14 January 2020, the Court has already ordered that Poland must immediately 
suspend the application of the contested national provisions on the powers of the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.23
In the meantime, in Hungary, the parliament pushed through a new emergen­
cy law24 on 30 March as a response to the corona crisis. Under the new law the 
Hungarian government under Prime Minister Orbán can rule by decree as well 
as suspend the enforcement of certain laws. This is just the latest development 
20 Tweet of 5 May 2020 by “Rule of Law in Poland”. 
21 “Eastern European states sense opportunity in German court ruling”, 10 May 2020, 
Financial Times.  
22 Commission Press Release of 29 April 2020.  
23 Order of 8 April 2020 in Commission v Poland, Case C–791/19.  
24 English translation of Hungarian draft law on “protecting against corona virus”.  
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since the coming into power of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party in 2010 that saw 
the introduction of a series of widely criticized constitutional reforms in Hungary. 
While it is outside the scope of this paper to trace all the rule of law developments 
in Hungary and the EU’s responses thereto,25 it should be recalled here that over 
the years the Commission has brought several infringement proceedings against 
Hungary in the context of its constitutional reforms, including the independence 
of the central bank, the removal of the data protection supervisor, and the man­
datory retirement of judges. As recently as 25 July 2019 the Commission decided 
to refer Hungary to the ECJ for its so-called ’Stop Soros law’. At the time of writing 
of this paper also this infringement procedure is pending before the ECJ. The ECJ is 
moreover expected to decide on the infringement action on the Hungarian ’NGO 
law’ in June 2020, which was referred to it in December 2017.26
The concern regarding the impact of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
ultra vires ruling on the situation in Poland and Hungary is clear: if the German 
court can openly defy an ECJ ruling without any further consequences, then what 
would prevent the Polish and Hungarian courts (or any other national court for 
that matter) to do the same? Considering the political weight that the judgments 
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht hold in EU law matters, it can be ex­
pected that that the Polish and Hungarian constitutional courts will refer to the 
German ruling as a means to increase the legitimacy of any of their own potential 
future decisions to not comply with an ECJ ruling, regardless of how different the 
nature of the cases may be. Similarly, it may be feared that also the Polish and 
Hungarian governments will (ab)use the judgment as a basis to reject any inter­
vention by the EU in their rule of law situations, especially now that both member 
states find themselves in front of the ECJ for breaches of EU law. 
While it is perhaps true that the Polish government “will do what it does, inde­
pendent of what [the German Constitutional Court] does”, as the presiding judge 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Andreas Voßkuhle, said in an interview.27 There 
is also little doubt that the judgment was celebrated amongst the Polish and Hun­
garian governmental and judicial ranks, as outlined above. In fact, both Polish and 
Hungarian authorities might have often contested the legitimacy of EU interven­
tion but, so far, they have yet to openly defy an ECJ ruling.  It is quite well possi­
ble that we will soon find out whether the German ruling will have an impact on 
the judicial decisions of other member states or not. On 14 May 2020, the ECJ, in 
a preliminary ruling, found that the Hungarian practice of holding migrants and 
asylum seekers in a transit zone amounted to the migrants’ detention and consti­
tuted a deprivation of liberty.28 The Hungarian government has already called the 
ruling an “incorrect interpretation”29 and announced that it will not accept the ECJ 
decision.30 It now remains to be seen whether the Hungarian courts will imple­
ment the ruling or whether they will seize the opportunity to follow the German 
example of not complying with an ECJ decision.
25 See for this: M. Bonelli, A Union of Values: Safeguarding Democracy, The Rule of Law and 
Human Rights in the EU Member States, (2019) PhD Thesis Maastricht University. 
26 Commission Press Release of 7 December 2017. 
27 “Erfolg ist eher kalt”, Interview with Andreas Voßkuhle, 14 May 2020, Zeit Online.  
28 Judgement of 14 May 2020, PPU FMS and Others, Joined Cases C–924/19 and C–925/19.  
29 “Hungary reacts to German constitutional court ruling”, 15 May 2020, EURACTIV. 
30 “Orbán won’t accept European court ruling on transit zone”, 19 May 2020, Daily News Hungary. 
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3.3  Third concern: implications for the ECB’s PEPP
Regarding the last concern related to the current corona crisis, it is conceivable 
that the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht will have more implications for 
the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme (PEPP)31 than it will for the 
PSPP itself. In the immediate aftermath of the judgment, Henrik Enderlein wrote: 
“Today, the Court shot at the PSPP, but hit the PEPP.”32 The PEPP is a bond purchase 
programme with an initial volume of 750 billion euro, which the ECB adopted on 
24 March 2020 as a means to counter the devastating economic effects of the co­
rona crisis. Under the programme the ECB and national central banks will pur­
chase public and private securities until at least the end of 2020. A challenge to the 
programme would have profound economic implications for member states but 
also private actors that are financially affected by the corona crisis. 
It is true that the Bundesverfassungsgericht explicitly distinguishes the PEPP from 
the PSPP, stating that its decision of 5 May 2020 does “not concern any financial 
assistance measures taken by the European Union or the ECB in the context of the 
current coronavirus crisis”.33 And yet, it is unlikely, or (as one commentator put it) 
wishful thinking,34 that the PEPP will not be affected by the PSPP decision at all. 
The reason is that the PEPP follows closely the rules of the PSPP, and similarly does 
not satisfy the proportionality requirements that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
has set out for the PSPP. In particular, as Isabel Feichtner points out in her anal­
ysis, both the wide and vague description of the PEPP’s policy objectives as well 
as the ‘whatever it takes’ approach underlying the programme, which does not 
take into account member states’ economic policies, would fall foul of the German 
court’s proportionality conditions.35 It is outside the scope of this paper to analyse 
whether or not the PEPP exceeds the ECB’s mandate.36 It suffices to point out that 
it seems likely that citizens, unsatisfied with the PEPP, will be encouraged by the 
judgment by the Bundesverfassungsgericht to also challenge the legality of the 
PEPP in the near future through a constitutional complaint before the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht. 
 
4 What the EU can do now 
If the decision by the Czech Constitutional Court in 2012 was considered “playing 
with matches”37 by some commentators, the decision of the German Constitution­
al Court in 2020 seems to qualify as “purposefully trying to start a fire”. As a conse­
quence, at least two response options seem available to the EU: 
31 Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary 
pandemic emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17).  
32 Tweet of 5 May 2020 by Henrik Enderlein. 
33 BVerfG Press Release No. 32/2020 of 05 May 2020.  
34 D. Kyriazis, “The PSPP judgment of the German Constitutional Court: An Abrupt Pause to an 
Intricate Judicial Tango”, 6 May 2020, European Law Blog.  
35 I. Feichtner, “In the Name of the People? – The German Constitutional Court’s Judgment on 
the European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Programme”, 13 May 20202, Just Money 
Working Paper. 
36 See for an assessment of the legality of the ECB’s PEPP: S. Grund, “Legal, compliant 
and suitable: The ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)”, 25 March 2020, 
Jacques Delors Centre/Bertelsmann Stiftung Policy Brief. 
37 J. Komarek, “Playing With Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution”, 
22 February 2012, Verfassungsblog.  
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•	 it lets the fire burn down by doing nothing, or
•	 it starts fighting fire with fire.
If the reactions by the EU institutions are anything to go by, the second option, in 
the form of an infringement proceeding, seems to be seriously considered at EU 
level. We would also advocate for such action in this policy paper. In this regard, 
the ECB,38 ECJ39 as well as the Commission have all issued statements recalling 
fundamental EU principles: EU law is supreme, ECJ rulings are binding on all na­
tional courts, and the ECB remains independent. In its press release, the ECJ also 
made note of the principle of equality between member states, which requires 
all national courts to ensure the full effect of EU law. Most notably, on 10 May 
2020, Commission President Von der Leyen issued a statement,40 in which she reaf­
firmed that it was the Commission’s task “to safeguard the proper functioning of 
the Euro system and the Union’s legal system” and that the “final word on EU law 
is always spoken in Luxembourg. Nowhere else.”
4.1  Option 1: let the fire burn down
As a matter of EU law, it is entirely possible for the EU to not react to the judgment. 
An infringement proceeding, the steps and merits of which will be discussed be­
low, is merely an option for the Commission to respond to a breach of EU obliga­
tions by a member state, not an obligation. There are indeed good arguments for 
the Commission to not take action and simply let the fire burn down.41 In particu­
lar there are doubts:
•	 what the outcome of an infringement procedure in this case could be, as the 
German government cannot rectify a judicial infringement of EU law;
•	 whether on its substantive grounds the dispute might not just resolve itself, 
thereby rendering an infringement procedure unnecessary when it comes to the 
further implementation of the PSPP.
Regarding the first point, it is in general possible for the Commission to launch an 
infringement procedure against a member state for actions by its highest national 
court. However, it has not done so often (see table below).42 The reason for this is 
that judicial infringements of EU law are very difficult to rectify. National courts 
are by their nature independent. National governments, who are the real address­
es of infringement procedures, cannot order their independent courts to follow 
an ECJ judgment. While from an EU law perspective that does not matter, an in­
fringement procedure would nonetheless put the German government – who rep­
resents the German state externally, also for actions of its courts – in quite a tough 
spot, as there is little it can do to rectify the infringement.
38 ECB Press Release of 5 May 2020. 
39 Court of Justice Press Release No 58/20 of 8 May 2020. 
40 Statement by Commission President Von der Leyen of 10 May 2020.  
41 Diane Fromage, for example, argues for a ‘de­escalation’ strategy rather than confron­
tation in the form of an infringement procedure, while still acknowledging the Bundesver­
fassungsgericht’s “fundamentally misguided and unlawful behaviour”. See: D. Fromage, 
“Weiss: The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Over-Expansive Interpretation of the Bundestag’s 
‘Responsibility For Integration’ and the Need to Adapt Judicial Review Procedures to the E(S)CB’s 
Specificities”, 23 May 2020, EU Law Live Weekend Edition No. 18. 
42 D. Sarmiento, “An Infringement Action against Germany after its Constitutional Court’s 
ruling in Weiss? The Long Term and the Short Term”, 12 May 2020, EU Law Live Op­Ed. 
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Even if the Commission successfully launches an infringement procedure and 
even if the ECJ in the end agrees with it, such a ruling would be merely declaratory 
in nature. Put differently, the Court would simply confirm the existence of a failure 
of Germany to fulfil its obligations. Under Article 260 TFEU Germany would as a 
consequence then be “required to take the necessary measures to comply with 
the judgment of the Court.” But what would be the point of this when the German 
government could not take such necessary measures since it has no control over 
the independent Constitutional Court or over the Bundesbank? Moreover, this is 
not a case in which a national court has wrongly interpreted EU law or failed to 
refer a preliminary question to the ECJ. It is a case in which the highest nation­
al court is not following the ruling of the European Court of Justice because it 
believes the latter to be outside the scope of the Treaties. It is unlikely that an 
infringement procedure would in any way sway the German Court’s stance on this 
or result in a rectification of the breach. In short: is an infringement action really 
the right way to resolve conflicting claims of authority?
In the worst­case scenario, starting an infringement procedure would throw every­
one involved into a constitutional conflict that would solve nothing and cause all 
actors to lose face with no gain to be won by anyone.
What is even more, on the substantive grounds of the case, i.e. the implemen­
tation of the ECB’s PSPP in Germany, it can be argued that there might not even 
be a need for Commission action. Crucially, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not 
shoot down the programme in its judgment but left some scope for the German 
Bundesbank to continue implementing the PSPP. All that must be done is for the 
ECB to issue a proportionality assessment for its programme within three months. 
From this point of view, the Commission could also decide to simply wait until 
the dispute resolves itself.  In fact, the argument has even been made that if the 
German authorities determine that a new decision by the ECB is sufficient in its 
proportionality assessment and that therefore the Bundesbank may continue in 
the programme, there would not even be an infringement of EU law anymore. In 
this regard Miguel Poiares Maduro on Verfassungsblog wrote: “In themselves, the 
statements of the German Constitutional Court with regard to the ECJ role are not 
an infringement if the judgment will no longer produce any effects contrary to EU 
law and its supremacy. The Commission could, in this way, continue to claim the 
supremacy of EU law without having to actually pursue an infringement against 
Germany.”43 While there is merit in this argument, we would still argue that the 
decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in itself can already constitute an in­
fringement of EU law.
4.2  Option 2: fight fire with fire
While letting the dispute simply fizzle out is indeed a possibility, in light of the 
legal significance of the judgment of 5 May 2020 and its possible ramifications, 
it might be ill­advised to let this incident pass without any consequences. We ar­
gue that not only can the Commission initiate infringement proceedings against 
Germany for the decision of its Constitutional Court, but it actually should do so. 
Launching an infringement procedure in this case would not be about the possi­
ble outcomes of such a procedure, the doubts regarding which remain valid, but 
43 M. Maduro, “Some Preliminary Remarks on the PSPP Decision of the German Constitutional 
Court”, 6 May 2020, Verfassungsblog.  
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it would be a matter of principle. Most notably, we argue that the Commission 
should take action against Germany in order to:
•	 protect the European legal order and the authority of the ECJ;
•	 give the German government an opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the 
Commission and reaffirm its commitment to EU law supremacy;
•	 pre­emptively send a warning signal to other member states and national courts, 
most notably but not limited to the captured ones in Poland and Hungary, that 
non­compliance with ECJ judgments will not be accepted;
•	 emphasize the notion of equality of States by avoiding double standards.
For an infringement procedure to be started, the infringement must be grounded 
in one of the provisions of the Treaties. It is true that the supremacy of EU law, 
the authority of the ECJ in questions of validity of EU law and even the legal bind­
ing effects of the ECJ’s preliminary rulings are in the end of the day all based on 
the ECJ’s own jurisprudence. But an argument can nevertheless be made that the 
duty of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to comply with the ECJ ruling follows from 
Article 267 TFEU, which sets out the preliminary reference procedure, in conjunc­
tion with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, according to 
which member states are obliged to take any appropriate measure to fulfil their 
obligations arising from Union law. 
In this regard, the ECJ has already long ago confirmed44 that any failure by a State or­
gan to fulfil its obligations under EU law can lead to an infringement procedure against 
that member state under Article 258 TFEU. This applies to actions or inactions of all 
State organs, including constitutionally independent institutions such as the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. In fact, in October 2018 the ECJ ruled45 that France failed to 
fulfil its obligations under the EU Treaties because of inaction of its highest adminis­
trative court. We therefore argue that, notwithstanding the doubts cast by some com­
mentators on this,46 it is indeed possible to launch an infringement procedure against 
Germany for a breach of Treaty obligations by the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself on 
the basis of Article 267 TFEU in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, without the need for 
further implementation of the judgment by other German authorities.
Table 3: Cases in which the Commission has started an infringement proceeding 
against the highest national court of a member state
Case What the case was about Why the Commission star-
ted an infringement proce-
dure
Spain (2008) The interpretation of an EU VAT 
directive
The Spanish Supreme Court inter­
preted the Directive erroneously.
France (2017) The reimbursement of taxes to 
French parent companies which 
receive dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries
The French Conseil d’État did not 
refer a question for preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ, even though 
it should have done so under 
Article 267 TFEU.
44 Judgment of 9 December 2003, Commission v Italy, Case C–129/00.  
45 Judgment of 4 October 2018, Commission v France, Case C–416/17.  
46 See in particular in the comments section: F. Fabbrini, “Suing the BVerfG”, 13 May 2020, 
Verfassungsblog. 
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Concretely, the Commission could send a letter of formal notice and a reasoned 
opinion under Article 258 TFEU to the German government,47 noting that the rul­
ing of 5 May 2020 constitutes a breach of EU law and inviting the German govern­
ment to explain how it will remedy this breach. More precisely, four breaches by 
the German court may be identified in this case:
•	 the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s unilateral declaration that the ECB’s decision is 
inapplicable; 
•	 the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s order to the German government and Bundes­
tag to ensure that the ECB and Bundesbank redraft the decision (which is a 
breach of Article 130 TFEU);48
•	 the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s failure to comply with a binding judgment of 
the ECJ; and
•	 the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s failure to ask a (follow­up) preliminary question 
allowing the ECJ to clarify its proportionality assessment of the ECB decision.
The Commission could try and play it ‘smart’ by only bringing the fourth infringe­
ment before the Court. That way the focus shifts to ensuring that national courts 
act in a spirit of sincere cooperation towards the ECJ. After all, it is this constructive 
cooperation which makes constitutional pluralism function in practice, not the 
insistence of both levels on their (mutually exclusive) claims of final authority. In 
a similar manner, the German government could use the opportunity to reaffirm 
its commitment to EU law supremacy and the authority of the ECJ. While it is clear 
that the government has no control over the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it could 
nonetheless enter into dialogue with the Commission via the reasoned opinion 
stage of the infringement procedure in order to defuse the situation. 
If, however, Germany, does not reply to the Commission’s reasoned opinion, or 
if the Commission finds that Germany’s reply is unsatisfactory to remedy the 
breach(es), the Commission can go to court. The ECJ could then, under Article 260 
TFEU, find that Germany has failed to fulfil its obligation under the Treaties, and 
require it to take the necessary measures to rectify the breach.
In any case, the Commission should take action against Germany for the breaches 
of EU law committed by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. Beyond providing 
for an opportunity for a dialogue with the German government on the matter, 
it would also shift the political pressure of (re)acting to the judgment from the 
central bank level to the governmental level, thus giving the ECB and the German 
Bundesbank some room to find a pragmatic solution regarding the implementa­
tion of the PSPP in Germany without having to consider political questions of EU 
law supremacy. Moreover, an infringement procedure would send important sig­
nals to Germany, Hungary, Poland and all other EU member states as regards the 
Commission’s willingness to defend the status of EU law supremacy and the EU 
legal order. The question is less about the outcome of the procedure and more a 
matter of principle to demonstrate that the Commission, as the guardian of the 
Treaties, will not accept any breaches of EU Treaty obligations, no matter the mem­
47 It should be added that if the Bundesbank were to comply with the Bundesverfassungs­
gericht’s order not to implement the PSPP, the ECB itself could start an infringement pro­
cedure before the ECJ similar to the procedure under Article 258 TFEU but based on Article 
271(d) TFEU. 
48 F. Martucci, “La BCE et la Cour constitutionnelle allemande : souligner les paradoxes de l’arrêt 
du 5 mai de la Cour constitutionnelle allemande”, 11 May 2020, Le Club des Juristes Blog.  
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ber state or the authority in breach of EU law. The EU legal order can only continue 
to exist and function if all member states, including their national courts, submit 
to the authority of EU law and the ECJ, and it is the Commission’s task to ensure 
this, in particular with a view to the situation in Poland and Hungary. 
Moreover, even if the Commission has full discretion in bringing infringement cas­
es, it would still be politically difficult for the Commission to explain why it has 
initiated proceedings against Poland and Hungary in the recent past for failure to 
comply with EU law but will not do so against Germany. Simply letting the Ger­
man judgment slide would, whether justified or not, (even further) reinforce the 
impression that some member states are more equal than others.49 Such impres­
sions of double standards, under a German Commission President in particular, 
would not only go against EU principles but also threaten the EU as a legal com­
munity more than a judgment by a national court ever could.
Procedurally, since direct appeals before the ECJ have an average length50 of 
19 months (or 10 months through expedited procedure), it would take some time 
before the ECJ could render a judgment in an infringement procedure. Still the 
Commission could already enforce the above­mentioned duty of sincere coopera­
tion incumbent on the German government and Bundesbank in the short term by 
requesting the ECJ to impose interim measures, as it has done in the infringement 
proceedings against Poland, as mentioned above. In the case on the logging of the 
Białowieża Forest, the Court even prescribed penalty payments51 for each day that 
Poland would infringe its order (imposing a halt to the logging). The Commission 
could ask the Court to do the same in the German case.
In addition to the European Commission, all the other member states could also 
bring such a case pursuant to Article 259 TFEU. 
Yet regardless of whether the Commission (or another member state) does so, it 
should be noted that under EU law, every German judge, civil servant or public 
office holder is required to ignore the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. To 
say that, from a domestic constitutional perspective, this would be rather difficult 
to do would be an understatement, putting the German Bundesbank in particular 
but also the German government and Bundestag in quite a tough spot. With a 
view to the situation in Poland and Hungary, it might also appear somewhat ironic 
for the European Commission to ‘invite’ German authorities to disregard a ruling 
of their own constitutional court, when it was exactly what Poland was criticized 
for in early beginning of its rule of law crisis: blatantly ignoring rulings of the Pol­
ish constitutional tribunal. However, the situation is fundamentally different here. 
It is one thing for a national authority to ignore a court ruling out of convenience 
or because it disagrees. It is arguably an entirely different thing if a national au­
thority does so in order to fulfil its obligations under EU law. Under the principle of 
sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) all German authorities are required to give 
full effect to EU law. Every act taken, by any agency of the German state, to give 
effect to the order by the Bundesverfassungsgericht to disapply the ECB decision is 
in itself an infringement that the Commission could bring before the ECJ.
49 Tweet of 8 May 2020 by Enrico Letta.  
50 European Court of Justice, Annual Report 2019 on Judicial Activity, p. 172.   
51 Order of 20 November 2017 in Commission v Poland, Case C–441/17.  
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Under established jurisprudence,52 a finding of non­compliance through an in­
fringement procedure would furthermore establish the basis for state liability. 
While admittedly the conditions for finding state liability as defined in ECJ case 
law53 may be difficult to meet, a private party suffering damages because of the 
German Constitutional Court’s ruling of 5 May 2020 could then claim compensa­
tion from the German state.
Conclusion: time to fight fire with fire
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, which has long been mockingly described as the 
dog that barks but does not bite, now has indeed bitten – and it has done so with 
more vengeance than most had anticipated. The judgment of 5 May 2020 has 
evoked many concerns, most notably in relation to the supremacy of EU law and 
the authority of the ECJ, the feared abuse by other member states such as Poland 
and Hungary, and the implications for the ECB’s PEPP. In light of these concerns, 
the judgment can no longer be qualified as playing with matches but goes far be­
yond that. In this policy paper we argued that while there might be good reasons 
for the Commission to just let the fire burn down, simply letting the judgment 
slide would be ill­advised. Most notably, the Commission should bring infringe­
ment actions against Germany for failure by its Federal Constitutional Court to 
comply with a binding ECJ ruling in order to:
•	 protect the European legal order and the authority of the ECJ;
•	 give the German government an opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the 
Commission and reaffirm its commitment to EU law supremacy;
•	 pre­emptively send a warning signal to other member states and national courts, 
most notably the captured ones in Poland and Hungary, that non-compliance 
with ECJ judgments will not be accepted; and
•	 emphasize the notion of equality of States by avoiding double standards.
In a time in which general trend of disregard for EU law can be witnessed, it is also 
time for the Commission to give up its cautious approach54 and start fighting fire 
with fire.
 
52 Judgment of 2 April 2020, Commission v Poland, Joined Cases C–715/17, C–718/17 and 
C–719/17.  
53 Judgement of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur, Joined Cases C–46/93 and C–48/93.  
54 Which could be witnessed in its handling of the adoption of the Hungarian emergency 
law during the corona crisis for example. 
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